Local administrative capacity in EU IUU carding compliance: evidence from Vietnam's two-tier government reform

Lý N. Hải

Faculty of Administrative Law, University of Law, Hue University, Hue, Vietnam.
Corresponding author: L. N. Hải, Lynamhai@hueuni.edu.vn

https://doi.org/10.67784/1014

Abstract. Vietnam has been under the European Commission's illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing "yellow card" warning since October 2017, undergoing five on-site inspections without achieving delisting, until the fifth inspection (March 2026) received the first clearly positive assessment. This study asks: what legal-administrative mechanism explains this shift, and does Vietnam risk relapse like Panama and Ghana, the two countries re-carded after having been delisted, if post-delisting institutionalization is not sustained? The paper combines three methods: doctrinal legal analysis, process tracing on Vietnam's case across five inspection rounds, and a configurational comparative analysis of 11 international yellow/red-card cases, extending an established four-factor framework of EU influence (market power, expertise, monitoring, and agenda-setting). Results show that these four factors do not explain the variation in processing time among countries with similar profiles, while Vietnam's positive turning point coincides in timing and legal content with the reallocation of fisheries management authority under the two-tier local government model. The study proposes adding a fifth factor, local/grassroots administrative capacity, and recommends that Vietnam sustain investment in commune-level enforcement capacity to ensure that delisting, if achieved, does not repeat the relapse risk.
Keywords: administrative capacity, combating IUU fishing, fisheries decentralization, process tracing, two-tier local government, yellow card.

Introduction. As of March 2026, after eight and a half years under the European Commission's "yellow card" warning, Vietnam had undergone five on-site inspections without achieving delisting (Bộ Nông nghiệp và Môi trường, 2026). Over the same period, the EU's carding mechanism had been applied to 27 countries worldwide (Naiki & Rakpong, 2022), with processing times varying enormously, from 10 months for the Philippines to over 100 months and still ongoing for Vietnam (Kim & Lim, 2024). This gap raises a core question: what explains the difference in compliance speed across countries, when most undertake similar types of reform (completing the legal framework, upgrading monitoring systems, and strengthening sanctions)?

This question also speaks to a long-standing debate in international compliance theory. Chayes & Chayes (1993) argued that most non-compliance with international agreements reflects a lack of capacity rather than deliberate defiance, giving rise to a "managerial" school that favours capacity-building over sanctions; Tallberg (2002), examining the EU specifically, found that enforcement and capacity-building work best combined, but did not identify which level of capacity, within a target state, is decisive. Cole (2015), studying compliance with human rights treaties, found bureaucratic efficacy specifically (rather than state capacity broadly defined) to be the decisive determinant of implementation, lending further support to the managerial account and underscoring the need to specify which level and type of capacity matters. The EU's carding mechanism against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which pairs a trade sanction with technical dialogue, is a clear instance of this combined approach, making it a useful setting for testing where, exactly, capacity constraints bind hardest (Garcia Garcia et al., 2021; Auld et al., 2023).

The most recent academic study of this mechanism, by Naiki & Rakpong (2022), analyzes Thailand's case in depth and argues that, beyond market power, the European Union also exerts three other factors to drive reform in third countries: expertise, monitoring, and agenda-setting (specifically, linking the IUU issue to labour conditions on board fishing vessels). This four-factor framework offers a valuable analytical tool (Naiki & Rakpong, 2022), but it was built from a single case, Thailand, where delisting occurred relatively quickly (45 months) and has never relapsed.

From a different angle, comparative scholarship has documented fisheries-governance and regulatory changes associated with the EU carding mechanism in third countries, while also highlighting limits and implementation gaps (Garcia Garcia et al., 2021; Auld et al., 2023; Kadfak et al., 2023). However, this literature focuses on cases that were successfully delisted, excluding relapse cases (such as Ghana and Panama) or unusually prolonged cases (such as Vietnam), which are precisely the cases that the four-factor framework struggles to explain.

This paper fills that gap by expanding the comparative dataset to 11 yellow/red-card cases, including relapse cases and the Vietnam case, to test whether Naiki & Rakpong's (2022) four-factor framework explains the variation in processing time. Combined with an in-depth process-tracing analysis of Vietnam's case and recent scholarship on Vietnam's national-to-local implementation dynamics (Kadfak et al., 2025), the study finds that the inherited four factors are insufficient to explain the more than 90-month gap between the fastest and slowest cases, and proposes adding a fifth factor, local/grassroots administrative capacity, tested through the coincidence between Vietnam's two-tier local government reform (July 2025) and the first positive turning point in the EC's assessment (March 2026).

Material and Method. The paper combines three complementary methods, corresponding to three layers of evidence: doctrinal legal analysis as the foundation, process tracing to examine Vietnam's case in depth, and configurational comparative analysis to situate Vietnam's case within international experience.

Doctrinal legal analysis. The foundational layer analyzes legal instruments and directive documents related to combating IUU fishing in Vietnam during 2017-2026, including the 2017 Fisheries Law and its implementing regulations, decrees on administrative sanctions in the fisheries sector (Decree 42/2019 and Decree 38/2024, which replaced it), Resolution 04/2024 of the Judicial Council of the Supreme People's Court, and the system of authority-devolution instruments in the fisheries sector issued during the transition to the two-tier local government model (Decree 131/2025/NĐ-CP; Circular 10/2025/TT-BNNMT). Building a complete timeline of these instruments, cross-referenced against the European Commission's initial yellow-card decision (European Commission, 2017), provides the basis for determining whether each step forward in the delisting process corresponds to a specific legal change.

Process tracing. Process tracing, following Beach & Pedersen's (2019) guidelines, is applied as the main tool for examining the explanatory sequence in the Vietnam case, using the sequence of five EU on-site inspections of Vietnam (2018, 2019, 2022, 2023, 2026) as observation points. At each point, the paper cross-references three types of data: the content of the EC's official assessments and recommendations, the legal instruments and administrative measures issued in the interval between two consecutive inspections, and structural administrative events, specifically the date the two-tier local government model took effect (1 July 2025). Data on the fifth inspection round are cross-referenced against Bộ Nông nghiệp và Môi trường's (2026) official reply to constituent petitions.

Configurational comparative analysis. To situate Vietnam's case within international experience, the paper builds a comparative dataset of 11 EU yellow/red-card cases (the Philippines, South Korea, Ghana [two rounds], Panama [two rounds], Solomon Islands, Belize, Curaçao, Thailand, and Vietnam), analyzed following a configurational, set-theoretic logic (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). The cases are coded according to the four factors

inherited from Naiki & Rakpong's (2022) analytical framework on Thailand (market power, expertise, monitoring, and agenda-setting). The magnitude of the market-power factor is cross-referenced against the quantitative evidence of Kim & Lim (2024), showing that fishery exports from yellow- and red-carded countries fall by an average of 23% and 83% respectively relative to pre-carding levels. Data on timing and delisting/relapse outcomes for the 11 cases are compiled from official European Commission decisions and press releases (European Commission, 2015, 2017, 2019), supplemented by academic literature for the Thailand case (Naiki & Rakpong, 2022) and for Ghana's repeated carding experience (Keijzer et al., 2024).

Results and Discussion

Results from the configurational comparative analysis. The coding table for the 11 EU yellow/red-card cases reveals a notable pattern: across the four factors inherited from Naiki & Rakpong's (2022) framework, most cases show an almost identical configuration, with all four factors present despite very large variation in actual processing time. In the fast-processing group, the Philippines took only 10 months and South Korea took 17 months, delisted on the very day Thailand was carded (European Commission, 2015), showing that South Korea's expertise/technical capacity (amending the Distant Water Fisheries Development Act, installing a VMS system, opening a 24-hour fisheries monitoring centre) was translated into enforcement action almost immediately. In the medium group, Ghana's first card (24 months) and Panama's first card (24 months) show comparable speed despite being in entirely different geographic regions (West Africa and Central America, respectively), suggesting that the shared four factors, rather than regional characteristics, are the dominant variable in this group.

However, in the slow and relapse group, the four-factor pattern no longer explains the difference. Ghana's second card (from June 2021, over 63 months and ongoing) and Panama's second card (from December 2019, over 81 months and ongoing) (European Commission, 2019) are both countries that had previously demonstrated sufficient capacity to meet the four factors at their first yellow card, yet relapsed after being delisted. Ghana and Panama are, to date, the only two countries to have received a second EU yellow card (European Commission, 2019). Comparative research on Ghana's case documents that the country's 2015 legal framework, though considered well-constructed, was not implemented or enforced in practice, allowing the situation to deteriorate and leading to the second yellow card (Keijzer et al., 2024). This is precisely the gap between "having the tools" and "having implementation capacity" that the existing four factors fail to measure. Vietnam (107+ months as of September 2026, not yet delisted) is the most extreme case in the dataset, sharing the same four-factor profile as the Philippines and South Korea, yet with a processing time more than ten times longer than the Philippines.

If these four factors were sufficient to explain the outcome, identical configurations should lead to similar results; reality shows the opposite. This finding has two methodological implications. First, the inherited four factors have explanatory value for whether improvement occurs at all (all 11 cases were recorded by the EC as showing some degree of improvement), but they do not explain the variation in timing, and in particular do not explain the relapse phenomenon. Second, this very gap suggests the existence of an uncoded condition, operating independently of the four known factors, capable of explaining both phenomena: abnormally prolonged duration (Vietnam) and relapse after delisting (Ghana, Panama).

Results from process tracing the case of Vietnam. The sequence of five EC inspection rounds of Vietnam (2018-2026) shows a clear inflection point in the nature of the EC's criticism, rather than a linear improvement process. The European Commission imposed a yellow card on Vietnam on 23 October 2017 (European Commission, 2017), setting out nine initial groups of recommendations. The first (May 2018) and second (November 2019) inspection rounds led the EC to narrow these down to four main recommendation groups: (i) legal framework; (ii) monitoring, control and inspection of fishing vessels; (iii) catch certification and traceability; and (iv) law enforcement. These four groups map almost

directly onto Naiki & Rakpong's (2022) four factors. During 2020-2021, the COVID-19 pandemic prevented the EC from conducting inspections, but Vietnam continued issuing legal instruments (a September 2022 national action plan set a target of installing vessel-monitoring devices on all fishing vessels 15m and above).

The third inspection round (October 2022) marked a turning point in the nature of the criticism: for the first time, the EC explicitly identified a different kind of shortcoming, namely limitations in provincial-level governance (specifically, local capacity to manage and monitor fishing vessels), rather than simply repeating recommendations within the four known technical factors. From that point until the fourth inspection round (October 2023, in Bà Rịa–Vũng Tàu and Bình Định provinces), Vietnam continued to issue instruments strengthening the legal framework and sanctions, such as Decree 37/2024 (amending Decree 26/2019 detailing the Fisheries Law), Decree 38/2024 (replacing Decree 42/2019 on administrative sanctions in the fisheries sector), and Resolution 04/2024 of the Judicial Council of the Supreme People's Court guiding criminal prosecution of transporting fishing vessels to illegally fish in foreign waters; yet the EC still concluded, in a letter dated 5 December 2023, that these efforts were "still insufficient" for delisting. This shows that adding further tools within the four known factors no longer produced a corresponding shift in the EC's assessment, a sign that the core issue had shifted to a different dimension.

A notable turning point in the sequence emerged after Decree 131/2025/NĐ-CP (12 June 2025) and Circular 10/2025/TT-BNNMT (19 June 2025) directly reallocated fisheries management and fisheries-surveillance authority under the two-tier local government model, issued just before the model officially took effect (1 July 2025). This was an intervention aimed squarely at the type of shortcoming the EC had identified since the third inspection round (2022): provincial-level governance capacity, not an additional technical measure. The fifth inspection round (9-18 March 2026; Bộ Nông nghiệp và Môi trường, 2026), taking place less than nine months after the two-tier model took effect, was the first of the five rounds to receive a clearly positive assessment from the EC: the head of the inspection delegation, Fernando Andresen Guimaraes of DG MARE, was reported as noting that Vietnam had made "extraordinary efforts" over more than eight years (The World and Vietnam Report, 2026), particularly in handling fishing vessels violating foreign waters, with the number of vessels seized by foreign authorities falling to 101 during the period from 2024 to 15 April 2026 (Bộ Nông nghiệp và Môi trường, 2026).

Local administrative capacity as a fifth factor. The two layers of analysis converge on the proposition that local/grassroots administrative capacity should be considered as a distinct implementation factor alongside Naiki & Rakpong's (2022) four-factor framework. The four existing factors answer the question of whether a country has sufficient legal, technical, and political tools to act, but not the question of whether the administrative level tasked with implementation has sufficient organizational capacity to act. These two questions are logically independent, and Vietnam's case shows they are also independent in practice.

This finding invites engagement with several theoretical currents in public administration and comparative law. First, from the perspective of policy implementation theory, Pressman & Wildavsky (1973) showed that the gap between policy intent at the formulation level and actual outcomes at the implementation level is a systemic phenomenon, not an exception; Cheema & Rondinelli (1983), surveying decentralization programmes across many developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, likewise found that devolving authority often fails in implementation because the administrative capacity at the devolved level is not commensurate with the volume of authority granted. Applied to this context, the central government's enacting a complete legal framework is a necessary but insufficient condition if the administrative level directly responsible for implementation lacks sufficient organizational capacity, resources, and clear accountability mechanisms to translate regulations into actual monitoring action at sea and at fishing ports. Second, the relapse phenomenon in Ghana and Panama may be interpreted through the concept of "institutional elasticity" proposed by Awasthi et al. (2022). In their study of India's petroleum-sector reform, the authors show that a reformed institution can gradually

"revert" to a state close to its pre-reform condition if the conditions anchoring the change are insufficient. This fits Ghana's case: the 2015 legal framework was widely regarded as well-constructed but was not implemented or enforced in practice, and this institutional weakening was followed by re-carding in 2021 (Keijzer et al., 2024). Third, Vietnam's prolonged experience despite the continued presence of the four existing factors is consistent with the proposition that local administrative capacity may operate as a distinct implementation condition, particularly where fisheries-management authority is devolved to sub-national levels. In this respect, the finding refines the managerial account of compliance advanced by Chayes & Chayes (1993) and extended to the EU by Tallberg (2002): it is not merely that capacity, generically defined, matters, but that sub-national administrative capacity specifically is the binding constraint once authority over enforcement has been devolved, a scope condition that neither study identifies, since both examine capacity at the level of the state as a whole rather than at the level of the sub-national unit tasked with day-to-day enforcement.

Practical implications for Vietnam's fisheries management. Sustainable delisting, avoiding the relapse risk seen in Ghana (Keijzer et al., 2024) and Panama (European Commission, 2019), requires sustaining and strengthening commune-level enforcement capacity, not merely completing central-level regulations. Based on the above findings, the study recommends: (1) sustaining and adequately investing in commune-level enforcement capacity after fisheries management authority is decentralized under the two-tier local government model, avoiding formal devolution unaccompanied by genuine implementation capacity; (2) establishing a mechanism to monitor and assess grassroots administrative capacity as an independent indicator, alongside existing technical indicators (VMS installation rate, traceability rate), to avoid repeating the "sufficient tools but insufficient implementation capacity" pattern that persisted throughout 2017-2025; and (3) drawing on the experience of Ghana and Panama to build a sustainable institutionalization mechanism after delisting, if achieved, to avoid relapse risk, specifically by maintaining grassroots monitoring mechanisms even after pressure from the EC eases. The two-tier government model, if applied in the right direction, could be an opportunity to strengthen this capacity more sustainably than under the previous three-tier arrangement, by shortening the distance between the policy-making level and the direct implementation level; however, this is also a risk if commune-level capacity is not invested in commensurately with the new volume of authority granted, a risk that needs to be closely monitored in the post-delisting period, should Vietnam achieve this outcome.

International comparative implications. The finding regarding the fifth factor also offers insight for other countries with similarly decentralized fisheries-management structures, particularly Panama and Ghana, the two relapse cases in the comparative dataset, where institutional and implementation capacity remain relevant to fisheries-policy effectiveness (Song et al., 2020; Keijzer et al., 2024). This pattern echoes evidence from other decentralized fisheries settings, where devolving formal management authority to sub-national bodies has been found to leave overlapping and ambiguously defined enforcement responsibilities unless accompanied by deliberate local capacity-building (Méndez-Medina et al., 2020). Ghana's case also illustrates how domestic implementation challenges can interact with external compliance pressures, creating a risk that formal legal reform is not sustained in practice (Keijzer et al., 2024). Testing this fifth factor on the Ghana and Panama cases, should suitable data on local administrative reform in those countries become available, is a feasible direction for future research that could further strengthen the generalizability of the current finding.

Limitations. The argument for a fifth factor currently rests on process-tracing evidence from a single case (Vietnam), the only country in the dataset to undergo a nationwide local administrative restructuring while under a yellow card, which limits the generalizability of the finding, although this very uniqueness is also what allows the phenomenon to be observed more clearly. At the time of writing (September 2026), Vietnam had not yet received a formal delisting decision from the EC, despite the positive fifth-round

assessment; the conclusion regarding a "turning point" therefore rests on a shift in the EC's assessment, not yet on a completed outcome; if the EC does not proceed to delist in the near term, the robustness of the argument would need to be reconsidered. Finally, the link between Decree 131/2025/NĐ-CP, Circular 10/2025/TT-BNNMT, and the fifth inspection's outcome is established through cross-referencing legal instruments and chronology, not through field research on the extent to which these instruments have actually been implemented at the commune level, a methodological limitation consistent with the scope defined from the outset (no new field survey).

Conclusions. This study tested an established four-factor framework of EU influence (market power, expertise, monitoring, and agenda-setting) on an expanded dataset of 11 EU yellow/red-card cases, combined with an in-depth process-tracing analysis of Vietnam's case across five inspection rounds (2018-2026). The results suggest that the inherited four factors help explain the occurrence of fisheries-governance improvement, but do not adequately account for differences in processing time, or for relapse after delisting in cases such as Ghana and Panama. Vietnam's case provides empirical evidence for a fifth factor missing from the existing analytical framework: local/grassroots administrative capacity. Vietnam's first positive turning point in eight and a half years under the yellow card coincides in timing and legal content with the reallocation of fisheries and fisheries-surveillance management authority under the two-tier local government model as set out in Decree 131/2025/NĐ-CP and Circular 10/2025/TT-BNNMT, rather than with any additional legal instrument or technical measure within the four old factors.

Theoretically, this finding extends the existing four-factor framework in a direction better suited to countries whose fisheries-management structure is deeply decentralized to local government, a characteristic that Thailand's case (the foundation of the original framework) does not have. In terms of policy, the study recommends: (1) sustaining and adequately investing in commune-level enforcement capacity after fisheries-management authority is decentralized, avoiding formal devolution unaccompanied by genuine implementation capacity; (2) establishing a mechanism to monitor grassroots administrative capacity as an independent indicator, alongside existing technical indicators; and (3) drawing on the experience of Ghana and Panama to build a sustainable institutionalization mechanism after delisting, if achieved, to avoid relapse risk.

Future research should test this fifth factor on other countries with similarly decentralized fisheries-management structures, particularly the relapse cases (Ghana, Panama), once suitable data on local administrative reform in those countries become available. At the same time, it will be necessary to continue monitoring whether Vietnam is formally delisted following the fifth inspection round, to fully verify the "turning point" argument this study advances.

Acknowledgements. The author thanks the Faculty of Administrative Law, University of Law, Hue University, for institutional support.

Author contributions. LNH conceived the study, conducted the legal and comparative analysis, and wrote the manuscript.

Conflict of interest. The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

Data availability. The data supporting the findings of this study (the QCA-style coding table for the 11 comparative cases and the process-tracing timeline for Vietnam) are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

Funding. This research received no external funding.

References

Auld, K., Baumler, R., Han, D. P., & Neat, F. (2023). The collective effort of the United Nations Specialised Agencies to tackle the global problem of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. *Ocean and Coastal Management, 243*, 106720. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2023.106720

Awasthi, K., Gopakumar, K. V., & Ojha, A. K. (2022). Why do institutions revert? Institutional elasticity and petroleum sector reforms in India. *Business and Society, 61*(1), 81-116. https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650320949829

Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2019). Process-tracing methods: foundations and guidelines. 2nd edition. University of Michigan Press, 328 pp. https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.10072208

Bộ Nông nghiệp và Môi trường (2026). [Official reply to constituent petitions from Đà Nẵng City on IUU enforcement]. Available at: https://mattran.danang.gov.vn/Portals/0/CV-BNNMT%20tra%20loi%20cu%20tri%20Da%20Nang%20ve%20IUU_sau%201.pdf. Accessed: September, 2026. [in Vietnamese]

Chayes, A., & Chayes, A. H. (1993). On compliance. *International Organization, 47*(2), 175-205. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027910

Cheema, G. S., & Rondinelli, D. A. (eds) (1983). Decentralization and development: policy implementation in developing countries. Sage Publications, 320 pp.

Cole, W. M. (2015). Mind the gap: state capacity and the implementation of human rights treaties. *International Organization, 69*(2), 405-441. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831400040X

European Commission (2015). EU acts on illegal fishing: yellow card issued to Thailand while South Korea & Philippines are cleared. Press release IP/15/4806. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_4806. Accessed: September, 2026.

European Commission (2017). Commission warns Vietnam over insufficient action to fight illegal fishing. Press release IP/17/4064. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-4064_en.htm. Accessed: September, 2026.

European Commission (2019). Commission notifies the Republic of Panama over the need to step up action to fight against illegal fishing. Press release IP/19/6755. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6755. Accessed: September, 2026.

Garcia Garcia, S., Barclay, K., & Nicholls, R. (2021). Can anti-illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing trade measures spread internationally? Case study of Australia. *Ocean and Coastal Management, 202*, 105494. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2020.105494

Kadfak, A., Barclay, K., & Song, A. M. (2023). EU trade-related measures against illegal fishing: policy diffusion and effectiveness in Thailand and Australia. 1st edition. Routledge, London, 94 pp.

Kadfak, A., Marschke, M., & Hanh, T. T. H. (2025). From extraction to surveillance: re-territorialisation of Vietnam's ocean frontier through fisheries reforms. *Maritime Studies, 24*, 16. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40152-025-00408-1

Keijzer, N., Galvis, L., & Delputte, S. (2024). Whose policy coherence counts? Assessing sustainable fisheries in Ghana and the European Union's engagement. *Development Policy Review, 42*(1), e12736. https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12736

Kim, D. E., & Lim, S. S. (2024). Economic impacts of the European Union carding system on global fish trade. *Marine Policy, 165*, 106208. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2024.106208

Méndez-Medina, C., Schmook, B., Basurto, X., Fulton, S., & Espinoza-Tenorio, A. (2020). Achieving coordination of decentralized fisheries governance through collaborative arrangements: a case study of the Sian Ka'an Biosphere Reserve in Mexico. *Marine Policy, 117*, 103939. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103939

Naiki, Y., & Rakpong, J. (2022). EU–third country dialogue on IUU fishing: the transformation of Thailand's fisheries laws. *Transnational Environmental Law, 11*(3), 629-653. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2047102522000206
Pressman, J. L., & Wildavsky, A. B. (1973). Implementation: how great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland. University of California Press, 182 pp.
Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C. (2012). Set-theoretic methods for the social sciences: a guide to qualitative comparative analysis. Cambridge University Press, 350 pp.
Song, A. M., Scholtens, J., Barclay, K., Bush, S. R., Fabinyi, M., Adhuri, D. S., & Haughton, M. (2020). Collateral damage? Small-scale fisheries in the global fight against IUU fishing. *Fish and Fisheries, 21*(4), 831-843. https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.12462
Tallberg, J. (2002). Paths to compliance: enforcement, management, and the European Union. *International Organization, 56*(3), 609-643. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199908
The World and Vietnam Report (WVR/VNA) (2026). Combat IUU fishing: deputy PM Tran Hong Ha holds meeting with European Commission's inspection delegation. Available at: https://en.baoquocte.vn/combat-iuu-fising-deputy-pm-tran-hong-ha-holds-meeting-with-european-commissions-inspection-delegation-372473.html. Accessed: September, 2026.

Received: 18 September 2026. Accepted: 17 October 2026. Published online: 29 October 2026.
Author:
Lý Nam Hải, Faculty of Administrative Law, University of Law, Hue University, 20 Võ Văn Kiệt, An Cựu Ward, Hue City, Vietnam, e-mail: Lynamhai@hueuni.edu.vn https://orcid.org/0009-0005-9918-742X
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
How to cite this article:
Hải, L. N. (2026). Local administrative capacity in EU IUU carding compliance: evidence from Vietnam's two-tier government reform. *Aquaculture, Aquarium, Conservation & Legislation, 19*(5), 2566-2573. https://doi.org/10.67784/1014